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Notes
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CIVIL RIGHTS - LEASED PUBLIC
PROPERTY AND STATE ACTION
Plaintiff, a Negro, was refused service solely on the basis
of his race by a privately operated restaurant located in a park-
ing building owned and operated by the Wilmington Parking
Authority, an agency of the State of Delaware. The parking
building project was financed by public funds or funds provided
by public bond issues or loans.' The building was constructed
for the sole purpose of providing a parking facility for the con-
venience of the public. Revenue from the rental of space in the
building to private businesses and proceeds from the parking
service were necessary to maintain the parking facility on a
self-sustaining basis. Upkeep and maintenance of the parking
building were the responsibility of the Authority at no expense
to the restaurant. Plaintiff sued for declaratory and injunctive
relief, contending that denial of service to him violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme
Court of Delaware 2 held that the plaintiff was not entitled to
relief because the Authority was connected with the restaurant
only to the extent of receiving rent which was not deemed a
sufficient connection with the state to make the restaurant's
operation state action. On certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court,8 held, reversed, three Justices dissenting.4 Under
1. The Authority was authorized to borrow money and to issue its own tax
exempt bonds. The city of Wilmington donated to the Authority a total of
$2,756,827.69, part of which was used to redeem bonds and pay off loans made
by the Authority. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 717,
718 (1961).
2. Wilmington Parking Authority v. Burton, 157 A.2d 894 (Del. 1960).
3. Plaintiff appealed on the ground that the state statute had been construed
unconstitutionally by a state court of last resort. The United States Supreme
Court denied the appeal but granted certiorari.
4. The Delaware Supreme Court had cited 24 DEL. CODE § 1501 (1953) and
stated: "We . . . hold that the operation of its restaurant by Eagle does not fall
within the scope of the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment." Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 157 A.2d 894, 902 (Del. 1960). The statute
provides: "No keeper of an inn, tavern, hotel, or restaurant, or other place of
public entertainment or refreshment of travelers, guests, or customers shall be
obliged, by law, to furnish entertainment or refreshment to persons whose recep-
tion or entertainment by him would be offensive to the major part of his cus-
tomers, and would injure his business." Justices Harlan, Whittaker, and Franik-
furter were of the view that the case should be sent back to the state court for
clarification of the basis of its decision before going into the question of state
action. Burton v. Wilmington Parking authority, 365 U.S. 715, 728 (1961).
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the circumstances the degree of connexity between the state and
the private lessee was such that discrimination on the basis of
race by the lessee constituted state action violative of the four-
teenth amendment. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
Since the decision rendered in the Civil Rights Cases5 in
1883, it has been consistently held that the prohibitions of the
fourteenth amendment are directed to the discriminatory acts
of the states and not to the discriminatory acts of private per-
sons. However the degree of connexity between a private person
and a state sufficient to constitute the acts of the former state
action, thus subject to the prohibitions of the fourteenth amend-
ment, has remained a difficult problem since the decision of the
Civil Rights Cases.6 The case of Shelley v. Kramer7 set the stage
for a very broad concept of state action.
Justice Harlan stated: "If . . . the state court meant no more than that under
the statute, as at common law, Eagle was free to serve only those whom it pleased,
then, and only then, would the question of state action be presented in full-blown
form." Id. at 730.
5. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court held a federal statute prohibiting discrimi-
nation on the basis of race in inns, public conveyances and places of public
amusement unconstitutional because the right not to be discriminated against was
secured only against aggression by the states under the fourteenth amendment.
Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the majority, stated: "It is State action of a
particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights
is not the subject-matter of the amendment." Id. at 11. The basis for the
Court's decision seems to be that the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment
are directed to the states. The fourteenth amendment reads in part: "No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens . . .; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." (Emphasis added.)
6. It appears that where such fundamental rights as freedom of speech or the
right to vote are involved, only very slight connection between the state and the
private party is required in order to find state action. In Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953) the only connection between the state and the private discrimi-
natory acts was that the state permitted a private political organization to hold
private elections from which all non-members were excluded. The winner of the
private primary had subsequently won the general election in every election year
since the 1930's. In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946), where a
Jehovah's Witness was forced to discontinue distributing handbills on the company
town sidewalk, the court stated: "We do not think it makes any significant
constitutional difference as to the relationship between the rights of the owner
and those of the public that here the State, instead of permitting the corporation
to operate a highway, permitted it to use its property as a town, operate a
'business block' in the town and a street and sidewalk on that business block."
In Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 519, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950), financial assistance given a private party by the
state was held not to be state action. For discussions of the state action con-
cept see Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375 (1958) ; Horowitz, The Misleading Search for
"State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L. REV. 208
(1957) ; Comment, 21 LouIsIANA LAW REVIEW 435 (1961).
7. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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In that case the Supreme Court held that state court en-
forcement of a restrictive covenant in a deed of private property
barring sale to Negroes constituted state action violative of
the fourteenth amendment. Shelley raised a question as to
whether any degree of state aid to private persons who discrimi-
nate in a manner offensive to the fourteenth amendment would
be considered sufficient to characterize the discrimination as
state action. 8 It appears, however, that the courts have found
no state action in the absence of either a reasonable degree of
control,9 or responsibility by the state,10 or a purpose to provide
a facility to the public."
Prior to the instant case, there had been no delineation by
the Supreme Court of what constituted state action in the leasing
of public property. An analysis of other court decisions reveals
three factors which seem to have been of primary importance
8. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) held that a racially restrictive
covenant is unenforceable at law for damages against a co-covenantor who sold to
a Negro. It appears that the application of the Shelley rule has been restricted to
situations in which a racially restrictive covenant is involved. See Williams v.
Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959) ; State v. Clyburn,
247 N.C. 455, 101 S.E.2d 295 (1958). For a discussion of the implications of the
Shelley case see St. Antoine, Color Blindness but not Myopia: A new Look at
State Action, Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MIcH.
L. Rev. 993 (1961).
9. In Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945), the court implied that state control attached to
subsidies given to a privately operated library, presumably because substantially
all of the revenues of the library were derived from the city. In Eaton v. Board
of Managers, 261 F.2d 521, 527 (4th Cir. 1958) the court distinguished the Kerr
case on the ground that little financial support was derived from the state,
stating: "The hospital is neither owned nor controlled by the municipalities and
the revenues derived from them on a contract basis amount to less than 4 per
cent of its total income." In Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 78
F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948), it was held that there was no state action because
there was no governmental control. In Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299
N.Y. 519, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950) it was held
that there was no state action although the state had used power of eminent
domain to obtain property to convey to Stuyvesant and had granted the corpora-
tion a twenty-five year tax exemption. The cases seem to indicate that state
financial aid without some form of accompanying control is not state action.
10. E.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946) ; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). It appears that the state
has responsibility in the sense that it has a duty not to permit discrimination
where the right invaded is fundamental. See note 6 supra.
11. Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 924 (1957) ("[T]he express purpose of the lease -was to furnish cafeteria
service for the benefit of persons having occasion to be in the County Courthouse.
[I]n rendering such service the lessee stands in the place of the County.").
See Jones v. Marva Theatre, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md. 1960) ; Simkins v.
City of Greensboro, 149 F. Supp. 562 (M.D. N.C. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 246
F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957); Tate v. Department of Conservation & Dev., 133 F.
Supp. 53 (E.D. Va. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956) ; Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W.
Va. 1948) ; Culver v. City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N.E.2d 82 (1948).
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in determining whether or not discrimination by a lessee of
public property constitutes discrimination by the state and thus
violates the fourteenth amendment. The first and most obvious
factor has been public ownership; the second, whether the prop-
erty was open to the public; and, finally, whether, in leasing
the property, the state's purpose was to provide a service to the
public.12
It is not entirely clear from the instant decision whether
the "state action" was considered to be the state's failure to
prohibit discrimination in the lease agreement itself,13 or wheth-
er the lessee's discrimination was considered state action merely
because of his connection with the state. The Court noted that
the Authority could have required the restaurant operator to
refrain from discrimination in its operation of the restaurant,
stating that: "[B]y its inaction the Authority, and through it
the state, has not only made itself a party to the refusal of serv-
ice, but has elected to place its power, property and prestige
behind the admitted discrimination. 1 14 If existence of the lease
agreement itself constituted state action, then the effect of the
decision is to consider this factor alone as determinative of the
state action concept.1" However, from a close reading of the
12. The three factors seem to have been determinative in finding state action
in the following cases: Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957) ; St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830, cert. de-
nied, 353 U.S. 922 (1957) ; Jones v. Marva Theatre, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md.
1960) ; Simkins v. City of Greensboro, 149 F. S upp. 562 (M.D. N.C. 1957), aff'd
per curiam, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957) ; Tate v. Department of Conservation
& Dev., 133 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Va. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 231 F.2d 615 (4th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956) ; Nash v. Air Terminal Services,
Inc., 85 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Va. 1949) ; Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004
(S.D. W. Va. 1948) ; Culver v. City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N.E.2d 82
(1948).
13. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961):
"[T]he Authority could have affirmatively required Eagle to discharge the
responsibilities under the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the private enter-
prise as a consequence of state participation. But no State may effectively
abdicate its responsibilities by either ignoring them or by merely failing to dis-
charge them whatever the motive may be."
14. Id. at 725.
15. This could be the basis for future decision of cases involving leases of
public property. In his concurring opinion in Garner v. Louisiana, 82 Sup. Ct.
248, 262 (1961), Mr. Justice Douglas reasons: "Race is an impermissible
classification when it comes to parks or other municipal facilities by reason of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. By the same token, I do
not see how a State can constitutionally exercise its licensing power over business
either in terms or in effect to segregate the races in the licensed premises. The
authority to license a business for public use is derived from the public. Negroes
are as much a part of that public as are whites. A municipality granting a
license to operate a business for the public represents Negroes as well as all other
races who live there." If the proscriptions of the fourteenth amendment require a
state to insure that a business on private property licensed by the state does ndt
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opinion it appears that the Court did not base its finding of state
action upon failure of the state to prohibit discrimination. 6
The Court listed several factors which established the con-
nection between the Authority and the private lessee. Among
those mentioned were: the land and building were publicly
owned; the building was dedicated to "public uses"; the restau-
rant was an integral part of the parking building; mutual bene-
fits were conferred on the Authority and the restaurant since
the restaurant was an integral part of the parking building;
plaintiff was refused service in a public building although he
would have been served on private property nearby; and receipt
of rent from the restaurant was necessary for financial support
of the Authority. The Court then stated: "Addition of all these
activities, obligations and responsibilities of the Authority . . .
indicates that degree of state participation and involvement in
discriminatory action which it was the design of the Fourteenth
Amendment to condemn."'17 The Court specifically limited its
decision to the facts and circumstances of the case and warned
against using the case as a test for every state leasing agree-
ment.'8 Consequently, a rule of general future applicability can-
not be derived.' 9
It is submitted that there are two factors which should be
essential to a determination of whether there is sufficient con-
nection between a private lessee and the state to constitute the
discriminate then a fortiori the same rule should apply when the state leases its
public property to a private party.
16. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)
"Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement
of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." The Court
also pointed out a variety of "activities, obligations and responsibilities of the
Authority" in connection with the lessee combined with the "obvious fact that
the restaurant is operated as an integral part of a public building devoted to a
public parking service." Id. at 724.
17. Id. at 724.
18. Id. at 723. A factor which seems now to be of little importance is the
purpose to provide a specific facility to the public. "[T]he Authority had no
original intent to place a restaurant in the building, it being only a happenstance
resulting from the bidding." Purpose to provide a facility to the public allowed
the courts to treat the private lessee as standing in the place of the state or its
subdivision. See, e.g., Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957) ; Tate v. Department of Conservation & Dev.,
133 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Va. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956).
19. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 305 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1961)
"Because readily applicable formulae may not be fashioned, the conclusions drawn
from the facts and circumstances of this record are by no means declared as uni-
versal truths on the basis of which every state leasing agreement is to be tested.
Owing to the very 'largeness' of government, a multitude of relationships might
appear to some to fall within the Amendment's embrace, but that . . . can be
determined only in the framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances present."
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acts of the lessee as state action. These are public ownership of
the leased premises and the lessee's holding the premises open
to the public.20 The right which is protected appears to be that
of a member of the public to enjoy public property in the same
manner as other members of the public. There would appear to
be no right of access during the term of the lease where the
premises are not held open to the public. For example, where
a religious or fraternal organization leases public property for
its own use, exclusion from the property is made on the reason-
able and constitutional basis of non-membership in the organiza-
tion. But where the lessee, holding the premises open to the
general public, excludes a portion of the public on the basis of
race, creed, or color, the exclusion is made on the basis of an
unreasonable and unconstitutional classification. 21
Because the conclusion reached by the Court seems to repre-
sent only a slight departure from that which would seem in-
dicated by prior decisions of other courts dealing with lease of
public property, 22 it would seem that the Court exercised undue
caution in not attempting to enunciate a rule capable of more
general application. It is submitted that the state action concept
is capable of definition within more specific limits than those
announced by the Court.
James D. Davis
20. See Abernathy, B.Epansion of the State Action Concept Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 43 CoRNELL L.Q. 375, 401 (1958), where the author suggests
that: "if the lessee chooses not to open the meeting to the public generally,
then there is no right, state or federal, of access in the public to the meeting.
The lessee can then discriminate on the basis of religion or non-membership in the
specific organization, whatever it may be." In all of the cases dealing with the
question of leases of public property to private parties the suit has resulted from
the fact that a member of the public has been denied access to property which is
held open to the public. See, e.g., Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957), where a Negro was denied service in a
cafeteria of a courthouse building; Jones v. Marva Theatre, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 49
(D. Md. 1960), where Negroes were required to sit in a separate section and use
separate toilet facilities in an auditorium of the town hall; Tate v. Department
of Conservation & Dev., 133 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Va. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 231
F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956), where Negroes were
denied access to state parks; Holley v. City of Portsmouth, 150 F. Supp. 6 (E.D.
Va. 1957), -where access to a swimming pool was denied Negroes.
21. It should be noted that whether the lessee holds the premises open to the
public or not, the "state action" is the same, e.g., lease of public property. The
determination of "state action" would not seem to turn on the degree of connec-
tion but whether or not the lessee restricts public access to the property uncon-
stitutionally. See Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957).
22. The only factor not present in the instant case was the purpose to provide
a service to the public. See note 12 supra.
